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FLYING FIRST CLASS: THE THIRD CIRCUIT ESTABLISHES A
METHODOLOGY FOR IMPLIED PREEMPTION ANALYSIS OF
FEDERAL PREMARKET APPROVAL REGULATIONS IN
SIKKELEE v. PRECISION AIRMOTIVE CORP.
JASON A. KURTYKA*
“A Law, by the very meaning of the term, includes supremacy. It is a
rule which those to whom it is prescribed are bound to observe . . . . If
a number of political societies enter into a larger political society, the
laws which the latter may enact . . . must necessarily be supreme . . . .
It would otherwise be a mere treaty . . . and not a government.”1
I. FLIGHT DELAYED: AN INTRODUCTION
The implied preemption doctrine illustrates the struggle between
consumer rights advocates who want multinational companies to be held
accountable for defective products and conservative proponents of tort reform who want to diminish liability for manufacturers traditionally subject
to state tort law.2 This tension often materializes in products liability litigation involving goods that have followed a federal administrative agency’s
* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A., 2015, Marquette University. Thank you to Jasmine Hempel and Thomas
Schick for your unwavering support. Thank you to Matt Kaiser for pushing and
mentoring me. Finally, I must thank Marie Bussey-Garza, Robert Turchick, and
the VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW editorial board for their editing and feedback on this
Casebrief.
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 33, at 200 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
2. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S 861, 894 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he Supremacy Clause does not give unelected federal judges carte
blanche to use federal law as a means of imposing their own idea of tort reform on
the States.” (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted)); THOMAS O. MCGARITY,
THE PREEMPTION WAR 17–18, 43 (2008) (describing preemption doctrine as preferred battlefield of tort reform advocates to diminish liability for manufacturers
traditionally subject to state tort liability); Lars Noah, Reconceptualizing Federal Preemption of Tort Claims as the Government Standards Defense, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV.
903, 905 (1996) (“[T]he use of the preemption defense in tort litigation sometimes immunizes defendants from liability irrespective of their conduct.”); see also
Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313,
1327 (2004) (criticizing Rehnquist Court for always favoring preemption when it
eroded state law claims and benefited businesses avoiding liability); Ernest A.
Young, Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349, 1377 (2001) (criticizing Rehnquist Court for appearing to favor federalist principles, but when it came
to preemption doctrine decisions it promoted federalization of tort law and diminished liability for interstate corporations); Stephen Labaton, ‘Silent Tort Reform’ Is
Overriding States’ Powers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/
2006/03/10/politics/silent-tort-reform-is-overriding-states-powers.html [https://
perma.cc/WAE8-AA9P] (“In the last three decades, the state courts and legislature
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premarket approval process that mandates minimum standards and design quality.3 Courts are then tasked with considering whether state
causes of action seeking compensation from injuries caused by a product
are preempted by federal standards that, if complied with, absolve liability.4 In Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp.,5 the Third Circuit addressed this
issue by integrating Supreme Court precedent on federal premarket approval regulations to develop a new, synthesized rule.6 Specifically, the
Third Circuit held that federal premarket approval processes do not preempt state products liability law, unless (a) the regulations or overarching
statute contains an express preemption clause or (b) “traditional conflict
preemption principles” make it impossible for the manufacturer to comply with both the federal and state standards.7
In a case of first impression, Sikkelee creates an instructive analytical
framework by unifying prior Third Circuit holdings that analyzed whether
premarket approval regulations implicitly preempted state law causes of
action.8 Part II of this Casebrief develops the context in which Sikkelee was
decided by providing an overview of the relevant regulations and Supreme
Court and Third Circuit precedent dealing with federal premarket aphave been vital avenues for critics of Washington deregulation. Federal policy
makers, having caught onto the game, are now striking back.”).
3. See Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 360–61 (2000) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (arguing that finding preemption in favor of railroad resulted in
“double windfall” where government foots safety bill and railroad is exempt from
liability); Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Supreme Court Preemption: The
Contested Middle Ground of Products Liability, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 194, 195 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds.,
2007) (“Because tort law is so thoroughly a traditional area of state governance,
the federalization of this branch of the common law threatens a serious reallocation of power in our delicate system of dual sovereignty.”); Richard A. Nagareda,
FDA Preemption: When Tort Law Meets the Administrate State, 1 J. TORT L. 4, 12–13
(2006) (discussing litigation concerning FDA premarket approval processes).
4. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2485 (2013) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine to note remedial role states play
through tort law); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 70 (2002) (stating
evidence of preemption was too sparse to erode state’s role in compensating victim); Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237, 249 (3d Cir. 2008) (“Federal regulatory programs frequently do not include a compensatory
apparatus . . . .” (citing Spriestsma, 537 U.S. at 64)); see also David G. Owen, Federal
Preemption of Product Liability Claims, 55 S.C. L. REV. 411, 441 (2003) (arguing that
courts should be cautious when constructing federal statutes in ways that override
state common law claims designed to compensate victims).
5. 822 F.3d 680 (3d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, AVCO Corp. v. Sikkelee, 137 S. Ct.
495 (2016).
6. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit’s opinion and rule statement
in Sikkelee, see infra notes 86–118 and accompanying text.
7. See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 702 (holding that Federal Aviation Administration
premarket approval regulations do not broadly preempt state law; rather, preemption only results through express mandate or impossibility of compliance).
8. See infra notes 119–33 and accompanying text for a critical analysis that
concludes Sikkelee unifies the reasoning developed in previous Third Circuit cases.
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proval.9 Part III then turns to the core analysis of Sikkelee that identifies
how the Third Circuit established its implied preemption framework.10
Next, because Sikkelee crystalizes the Third Circuit’s premarket approval
preemption framework, Part IV provides recommendations to Third Circuit practitioners on how to incorporate Sikkelee into their arguments.11
Finally, Part V of this Casebrief concludes that Sikkelee marks an appropriate preservation of state police powers in the face of an ever expanding
federal regulatory system.12
II. NEVER-ENDING SECURITY LINE: INTERACTION BETWEEN IMPLIED
PREEMPTION AND FEDERAL PREMARKET APPROVAL PROCESSES
Depending on how Congress has articulated its will through legislation or regulation, preemption can be either express or implied.13 Ex9. See infra notes 13–75 and accompanying text for an examination of rules
and cases crucial to understanding Sikkelee.
10. See infra notes 76–118 and accompanying text for the facts and a narrative
analysis of Sikkelee.
11. See infra notes 119–41 and accompanying text for critical analysis that integrates previous Third Circuit cases to contextualize Sikkelee.
12. See infra notes 142–44 for a prediction on the impact of Sikkelee.
13. See Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152–53
(1982) (“Preemption may be either express or implied, and ‘is compelled whether
Congress’ command is explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.’ ” (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S.
519, 525 (1977))); Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 724 F.3d 297, 302 (3d Cir. 2013)
(“Pre-emption may be either express or implied . . . .” (citing Gade v. Nat’l Solid
Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992))); see also JAMES T. O’REILLY, FEDERAL
PREEMPTION OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW 14 (2006) (stating that “preemption may be
either express or implied” depending on whether it is explicitly stated in federal
statute or implied by its “structure and purpose”); KENNETH STARR ET. AL., THE LAW
OF PREEMPTION 15, 18 (1991) (noting that preemption is derived from congressional intent, which can be arrived at either expressly or implicitly). The doctrine
of preemption itself is derived from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. See
U.S. CONST. ART. VI, CL. 2; see, e.g., Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1949 (2013)
(“Under the Supremacy Clause Congress has the power to pre-empt state law expressly.” (citing Brown v. Hotel & Rest. Emps. & Bartenders Intern. Union Local
54, 468 U.S. 491, 500–01 (1984))). In this sense, supremacy is a delegated and
defined power of Congress; therefore, any federal law “made in pursuance” of the
Constitution has the propensity to preempt state law. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (describing Supremacy Clause as having “nullifying” effect on state law that conflicts with federal law); N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v.
Winfield, 244 U.S. 147, 148 (1917) (“[I]t is settled that when Congress acts upon
the subject all state laws covering the same field are necessarily superseded by reason of the supremacy of the national authority.”); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 5.21, at 412 (5th ed. 2015) (noting
that preemption doctrine is derived from Supremacy Clause). Despite the uniform consensus that Congress’s power to preempt derives from the Supremacy
Clause, Professor Stephen A. Gardbaum makes a compelling argument that it is
the Necessary and Proper Clause, not the Supremacy Clause that generates Congress’s power to preempt. See Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 767, 770 (1994) (describing it as “consequential error”).
Supremacy and preemption, Gardbaum argues, are quite different legal concepts.
See Stephen A. Gardbaum, Congress’s Power to Preempt the States, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 39,
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press preemption is typically effectuated through a written preemption
clause in the federal statute where Congress makes its intent to displace
state law evident.14 Conversely, implied preemption results when a court
40 (2005) (“Supremacy and preemption are distinct constitutional concepts . . . .”). His first premise is that the Supremacy Clause, on its face, is a dispute
resolution mechanism and does not grant any affirmative powers. See Gardbaum,
The Nature of Preemption, supra, at 774–75 (stating use of Supremacy Clause). The
Supremacy Clause only applies in instances of conflict between federal and state
law, where the federal law trumps or displaces the state law. See Gardbaum, Congress’s Power to Preempt the States, supra, at 41 (explaining when Supremacy Clause
applies). Preemption, on the other hand, means the displacement of non-conflicting state law, which is a process that occurs automatically when the federal law is
passed. See id. (contrasting preemption). As such, the power to preempt exists
before the underlying conflict arises and can displace state law immediately, conflict or not. See Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, supra, at 776–77. Thus, preemption, as a power, is greater than supremacy because of its automatic operation.
See id. at 774–75. Gardbaum sums up his hypothesis with the following syllogism:
A greater power cannot (logically) derive from a lesser one. Preemption
is a greater federal power than supremacy (that is, the ability of congressional legislation to preempt state lawmaking power constitutes a greater
inroad on state power than the principle that federal law trumps state law
when the two conflict). Therefore, preemption cannot (logically) derive
from supremacy.
Id. After determining that it is neither the Supremacy nor the Commerce Clause
that gives Congress the power of preemption, Gardbaum arrives at the Necessary
and Proper Clause. See Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, supra, at 781;
Gardbaum, Congress’s Power to Preempt State Law, supra, at 49–50. He argues that,
historically, it is the Necessary and Proper Clause which gives Congress the power
to enact uniform laws as a method to regulate interstate commerce. See
Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, supra, at 781. If Congress desires to enact
uniform federal law, it has the power to preempt state law, whether conflicting or
not. See id. at 781–82. Understanding preemption this way, Gardbaum argues,
leads to the conclusion that preemption can only be achieved via express preemption because Congress is exercising an enumerated power. See id. at 783.
Gardbaum’s hypothesis, unfortunately, has not caught on, at least among Supreme
Court Justices. See, e.g., Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288,
1297 (2016) (citing Supremacy Clause as source of preemption).
14. See N.Y. State Dept. of Soc. Servs. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) (“If
Congress is authorized to act in a field, it should manifest its intent clearly. It will
not be presumed that a federal statute was intended to supersede the exercise of
power of the state . . . .” (quoting Schwartz v. Texas, 334 U.S. 119, 202–03 (1952)));
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“clear and manifest
purpose of Congress” (citations omitted)); see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 88 n.13 (2006) (“[W]e are concerned instead with
Congress’ intent in adopting a pre-emption provision, the evident purpose of
which is to limit the availability of remedies under state law.”); Barber v. Unum
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 383 F.3d 134, 136 (3d Cir. 2004) (finding express text of
ERISA preempts state law claim). A clear-cut example of express preemption
comes from Jones v. Rath Packing Co., which involved a conflict between California
law and the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA). 430 U.S. 519 (1977). On one
hand, the state statute required that packages of bacon weigh an amount equal to
or greater than what was listed on its packaging, while the federal law allowed for
reasonable variations due to moisture loss. See id. at 526–28 (explaining pair of
regulations appellee was subject to). Stuck between two contradictory requirements, the plaintiff turned to a federal law provision that prohibited the implementation of “[m]arketing, labeling, packaging, or ingredient requirements in
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determines that despite Congress not articulating its intent in writing,
state law is nonetheless preempted based on the structure or objective of
the federal law.15 Implied preemption operates through either conflict or
field preemption—both of which will be explained in Section II(A).16 Imaddition to, or different than, those made under” the FMIA. See id. at 530 (citing
entirety of FMIA). The clause spoke for itself and the conflicting state regulation
was displaced. See id. (“We therefore conclude [California state law is] pre-empted
by federal law.”). Even if a litigant convinces the court the federal law allows preemption of state law, the argument must turn to whether the state law falls under
the intended scope of preemption. See O’REILLY, supra note 13, at 60 (citing Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case Study of
the Failures of Textualism, 33 HARV. J. LEGIS. 35, 45 (1996)) (noting that merely
determining federal statute expressly permits preemption is only part of express
preemption analysis). This consideration is again one of congressional intent and
requires a parsing of the statute to determine what is inside and outside Congress’s
intended scope. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 758
(1985) (finding state law outside scope of National Labor Relations Act); see also
Fisk, supra, at 45 (noting that ERISA trumps all relevant state law, thus has wide
scope). In the Jones example this analysis was relatively straightforward because
both statutes regulated the same object—bacon—and the federal law on its face
was intended to apply to packaging. See Jones, 430 U.S. at 530. An example of a
statutory technique that deters a finding of express preemption is a savings clause.
See Geier, 529 U.S. at 861, 868, 870 (2000) (reasoning saving clause exempts state
tort suits from preemption, but not interpreting clause too broadly as to disrupt
balance of federal regulation); Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374,
378 (1992) (noting applicability of saving clause); Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., 164 F.3d 186, 194 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding existence of savings clause
as expressly retaining state law causes of action); see also Mary J. Davis, Unmasking
the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967, 994 (2002) (noting that
increased use of saving clauses required courts to take harder looks at congressional intent). A typical savings clause states that the remedy provided by the federal statute is in addition to any remedy for the same harm provided by state law.
See, e.g., Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 562 U.S. 323, 329 (2011) (quoting saving clause); Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 59 (2009) (“Compliance with this chapter or standards, regulations, or orders prescribed under this
chapter does not relieve a person of liability under State law.” (quoting 46 U.S.C.
§ 4311(g))). But see Roth v. Norfalco LLC, 651 F.3d 367, 378–79 (3d Cir. 2011)
(noting absence of savings clause leaves little room for non-federal regulation).
Inelegantly, the presence of a savings clause instructs courts on whether to use the
Supremacy Clause because it specifically contemplates the existences of concurrent regulation, as opposed to exclusive federal dominance. See Geier, 529 U.S. at
868 (finding existence of saving clause as assumption that there are common-law
claims to save); see also Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J.
2085, 2091 (2000) (casting saving clauses as congressional demarcations of boundaries that indicate where scope of preemption ends).
15. See de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. at 152–53 (reasoning that preemption may be
implied when “implicitly contained in [a statute’s] structure and purpose” (quoting Jones, 430 U.S. at 525)); Buzzard v. Roadrunner Trucking, Inc., 966 F.2d 777,
780 (3d Cir. 1992) (“In the absence of explicit statutory language, however, Congress implicitly may indicate an intent to occupy a given field to the exclusion of
state law.”); Pa. Med. Soc’y v. Marconis, 942 F.2d 842, 848 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Congress’ intent to preempt nonetheless can be inferred . . . .”); see also STARR, supra
note 13, at 18 (“[T]he Court typically has not denied preemption challenges solely
because statutory language and history were insufficiently unclear.”).
16. See STARR, supra note 13, 18–30 (dividing implied preemption into multiple categories, most important of which are conflict and field preemption). See
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plied preemption is a tool a defendant can use to convince a court that
Congress did not intend for the state to impose a standard of care in a
particular area of regulation.17 Section II(B) will examine premarket approval regulations of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and Department of Transportation (DOT) to develop context for the interaction
between federal regulations and implied preemption.18
A. Have Your ID and Boarding Pass Ready: Analysis of Implied Preemption
Rules Applicable to Premarket Approval Schemes
Determining whether federal premarket approval processes preempt
state causes of action begins with an application of the presumption
against preemption.19 To overcome this presumption, the preemption advocate must demonstrate Congress’s “clear and manifest” intent to preempt.20 In some cases “where there has been a history of significant
generally id. at 31–34 for background information and case citations regarding
obstacle preemption, a spinoff of conflict preemption that this Casebrief does not
address. See also generally Kenneth W. Starr, Reflections on Hines v. Davidowtiz: The
Future of Obstacle Preemption, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005) (discussing seminal case of
obstacle preemption).
17. See MCGARITY, supra note 2, at 61 (describing arguments that federal approval processes preempt state law claims as among most common of preemption
claims); Betsey J. Grey, Make Congress Speak Clearly: Federal Preemption of State Tort
Remedies, 77 B.U. L. REV. 599, 584, 586 (1997) (discussing cases where preemptory
effect of premarket approval schemes were at issue); Noah, supra note 2, at 925–26,
928, 932 (noting cases involving medical devices, pesticides and other chemicals,
as well as various modes of transportation cases that where parties have proffered
premarket approval implied preemption arguments). But see Issacharoff &
Sharkey, supra note 3, at 201 (explaining how federal interest in preemption is
typically weaker in products liability claims than, for example, in foreign relations).
18. See infra notes 44–75 and accompanying text for background of federal
premarket approval regulations and cases that analyze them.
19. See Hillman v. Maretta, 133 S. Ct. 1943, 1950 (2013) (beginning analysis by
citing presumption against preemption, particularly because case involved family
law); Farina v. Nokia Inc., 625 F.3d 97, 116 (3d Cir. 2010) (“The presumption
applies with particular force in fields within the police power of the state, but does
not apply where state regulation has traditionally been absent.” (citing Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) and Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm.,
531 U.S. 341, 347 (2001))); see also O’REILLY, supra note 13, at 7 (describing that
when subject matter is traditionally regulated by states, then courts will rely more
heavily on rule, which requires preemption advocates to submit proof of specific
intent to preempt). But see Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist.,
541 U.S. 246, 256 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority for not invoking presumption against preemption); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312,
334–35 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Federal laws containing a preemption
clause do not automatically escape the presumption against preemption.” (citing
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005))).
20. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“So we start
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest intent of
Congress.” (citations omitted)); see also Ass’n N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs v. Governor
of N.J., 707 F.3d 238, 240 (3d Cir. 2013) (citing Rice for presumption against preemption); Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 336 (3d Cir. 2009)
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federal presence” the presumption is nonexistent or not applied at all.21
Nevertheless, in products liability claims where states have historically
compensated victims, the presumption casts a shadow of skepticism on
preemption arguments.22
(same); Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 366 (3d Cir. 1999) (same);
Bass River Assoc. v. Mayor, Twp. Comm’r, Planning Bd. of Bass River, 743 F.2d 159,
162 (3d Cir. 1984) (same); Nat’l State Bank, Elizabeth N.J. v. Long, 630 F.2d 981,
985 (3d Cir. 1980) (same); Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 819 v. Byrne, 586
F.2d 1025, 1039 (3d Cir. 1977) (same). This presumption serves as a reminder
that the federal government’s ability to regulate must be derived from an express
constitutional power and if such delegation is lacking, the power of regulation
should be left with the states. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)
(“Consideration under the Supremacy Clause starts with the basic assumption that
Congress did not intend to displace state law.” (citing Rice, 331 U.S at 230)); see also
Bates, 544 U.S. at 449 (“[W]e have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly
pre-empt state-law causes of action.” (citing Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485)); N.Y. State
Dept. of Soc. Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 413 (1973) (noting need to preserve
balance of federal and as such preemption should not be “lightly assumed”); Roth,
651 F.3d at 375 (citing Bates for same proposition); Farina, 625 F.3d at 116 (same);
Indian Brand Farms, Inc. v. Novartis Crop Prot. Inc., 617 F.3d 207, 224 (3d Cir.
2010) (citing Lohr for same proposition); Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C.,
539 F.3d 237, 248 (3d Cir. 2008) (same).
21. See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 28, 108 (2000) (“[A]ssumption of
non-preemption is not triggered when the State regulates in an area where there
has been a history of significant federal presence.” (citing Jones v. Rath Packing
Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977))); Lozano v. City of Hazelton, 724 F.3d 297, 314 n.23
(3d Cir. 2013) (citing Locke for proposition that when state regulates in area of
federal presence, such as immigration, presumption against preemption need not
be applied). Relative pervasiveness of the presumption differs from case to case.
See Hillsborough Cty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715–16
(1985) (finding that when matters of “local health and safety” are involved, high
barrier of presumption is erected); Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132, 144 (1963) (applying stronger presumption against preemption when in
area “traditionally regarded as properly within the scope of state superintendence”). But see Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 1324 (arguing that presumption
against preemption is only paid lip service to and not actually employed); Dinh,
supra note 14, at 2087 (demonstrating “illogic of a general presumption against
preemption”). The mere presence of federal regulation alone, however, does not
necessarily mean the presumption does not apply. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S.
555, 565 n.3 (2009) (denying defendant’s argument that presumption should not
apply, because “[t]he presumption thus accounts for the historical presence of
state law but does not solely rely on the absence of federal regulation”); see also
Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485 (applying presumption despite presence of federal health
and safety law); Farina, 625 F.3d at 116 (reasoning that presence of FCC law in
state regulation did not generate conclusion that presumption did not apply).
22. See Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2485 (2013) (“[C]ommonlaw claims ‘necessarily preform an important remedial role in compensating accident victims.’ ” (quoting Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 64 (2002)));
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984) (explaining despite federal regulation of nuclear facilities, Congress did not intend to preempt states’ role
in compensating victims of nuclear accidents); Fellner, 539 F.3d at 249 n.7 (“Federal regulatory programs frequently do not include a compensatory apparatus . . . .” (citing Spriestsma, 537 U.S. at 64)); see also Owen, supra note 4, at 441
(arguing that courts should be cautious when constructing federal statutes in ways
that override state common law claims designed to compensate victims).
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1. Conflict Preemption
Conflict preemption analysis considers whether concurrent compliance with a federal law and state standard is possible.23 Courts first examine the scope of the two laws to determine what each law requires of
the party advocating for preemption.24 That party must demonstrate that
an actual conflict exists, meaning that the two laws conflict and the clash
makes it impossible to satisfy both requirements.25 Nevertheless, there
may be situations where Congress only intended to prescribe minimum
federal standards, leaving room for states to set higher standards of care.26
23. See Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 844 (1997) (noting that conflict preemption arises from direct clash between state and federal law and “[c]onventional
conflict pre-emption principles require pre-emption ‘where compliance with both
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility, . . . or where state law
stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress.’ ” (quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505
U.S. 88, 98 (1992))); Simon v. FIA Card Serv., 732 F.3d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 2013)
(citing Gade for same proposition); cf. Robert R. Gasaway & Ashley C. Parish, The
Problem of Federal Preemption: Toward a Formal Solution, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION:
STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 219, 221 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S.
Greve eds., 2007) (countering scholars such as Gardbaum and Chemerinsky and
arguing for “robust” implied preemption doctrine that protects federal
prerogatives).
24. See, e.g., Gade, 505 U.S. at 91–93 (opening opinion by describing scope of
both federal and state law and describing where they conflict); Fellner, 539 F.3d at
251 (explaining that defendant offered three theories on why scope of federal law
sufficiently conflicted with state regulation); see also Gasaway & Parrish, supra note
23, at 220 (“Courts have increasingly recognized that when federal decision makers make an affirmative judgment in favor of a certain, optimum level of regulation . . . that judgments operates as a negative judgment on state law . . . .”
(emphasis in original)).
25. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev.
Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 205–06 (1983) (explaining that despite federal Atomic
Energy Act not expressly requiring or prohibiting states from constructing or authorizing constructing nuclear power plants, conflict preemption principles apply
because of dichotomous federal and state requirements); Fla. Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc., 373 U.S. at 143 (noting in dicta that conflict preemption requires
“impossibility of dual compliance,” where products could not be labeled under
state law without violating federal law); N.J. Chamber of Commerce v. Hughey, 774
F.2d 587, 594 (3d Cir. 1985) (explaining that it was impossible to comply with both
state right-to-know law and federal OHSA standard). But see Bates, 544 U.S. at
445–46 (rejecting proposition of “implied inducement” argument where state tort
judgment would require defendant to adopt remedial measures that put it in conflict with federal regulations).
26. See Williamson v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 562 U.S. 323, 335 (2011)
(reasoning that imposing stricter standards that treated federal standards as maximum standards would render minimum standards clause as meaningless); Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 286 (1995) (noting that federal statute
proscribed “minimum standards,” which allowed state to establish their own standards); Hillsborough Cty., 471 U.S. at 722 n.5 (“The federal interest at stake here is
to ensure minimum standards not uniform standards.”); Horn v. Thoratec Corp.,
376 F.3d 163, 186 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting medical device premarket approval
processes set minimum standard but not “ceiling”).
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Under these circumstances, this type of arrangement is not conflict preempted because compliance is practicable.27
Indicative of the need for actual conflict is the Third Circuit’s opinion
in Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C.28 There, the plaintiff brought a state
failure-to-warn claim against a tuna packager alleging that the tuna’s mercury content injured her.29 In its defense, the seafood company argued
that the plaintiff’s claim should be conflict preempted because: (1) the
FDA had adopted a “pervasive regulatory approach” to regulate mercury
content, (2) the FDA chose not to require warning labels on tuna, and (3)
any requirement of a warning label would constitute “misbranding” under
federal law.30 The Third Circuit determined none of the arguments generated an actual conflict between state and federal law because the FDA’s
actions on mercury content did not amount to an official “federal legal
standard.”31 Fellner’s holding posits that a court must find an applicable
and affirmative federal standard before considering whether dual compliance of state and federal law is impossible.32
2. Field Preemption
Field preemption and conflict preemption are considered distinct
concepts, despite being subcategories of implied preemption.33 Certain
federal regulation is so comprehensive that courts have determined federal law occupies the entire field of law, effectively boxing out state regulation in that field.34 For example, field preemption arguments are more
27. Compare Sprietsma, 537 U.S. at 69 (finding that compliance between federal standard and state standard was achievable) and Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 258 (reasoning state law claim for punitive damages and federal regulations of nuclear
facilities could coexist), with PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 617–18 (2011)
(holding that because generic drug manufactures are bound by federal law to replicate name-brand version, state law is preempted where it imposes heightened
labeling requirement).
28. 539 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2008).
29. See id. at 240–41 (explaining that plaintiff alleged her diet consisted
mostly of defendant’s seafood products and she became sick from mercury poison
due to defendant’s failure to warn her of chemical content).
30. See id. at 248–49, 251–54 (addressing defendant’s three theories on why
federal labeling law preempted state failure-to-warn claims).
31. See id. at 256 (“Fellner’s lawsuit does not conflict with the FDA’s ‘regulatory scheme’ for the risks posed by mercury in fish or the warnings appropriate for
that risk because the FDA simply has not regulated the matter.”).
32. See id. (explaining that because FDA only issued consumer advisory regarding dangers of mercury, but did not create any substantive policy or rules on
issue, no conflict could exist).
33. See Goodspeed Airport LLC v. E. Haddam Inland Wetlands & Watercourses Comm’n, 634 F.3d 206, 209 n.4 (2d Cir. 2011) (noting that while conflict
and field preemption are both subsets of implied preemption and conflict could
be thought to be subset of field preemption, courts conceptualize two forms of
implied preemption separately and apply different rules to analyze each (citing
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990))).
34. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 633
(1973) (“[T]he Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so
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likely to succeed in areas where federal interests have been historically
paramount, such as maritime, environmental, immigration, and commercial aviation.35 State regulation need not conflict with federal law in areas
with a dominant federal interest, because if Congress chooses to “occupy
the field,” all state regulations must acquiesce.36 Finding field preemption
requires parsing federal statutory, regulatory, and legislative history to
conclude that Congress intended to completely control a specific area of
regulation.37
In Abdullah v. American Airlines,38 the Third Circuit found Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations field preempted a state negligence claim brought following injuries sustained when a commercial flight
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state
laws on the same subject.” (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947))). Even if state regulation arguably does not conflict with the operation of federal law in a given area, field preemption will still invalidate it. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-27, at 497 (2d. ed. 1988). Two
factors play into whether Congress intended to preempt an entire field, namely
“(1) whether Congress has pervasively regulated with such global breadth as to
leave no room for competing centers of regulatory power, and (2) whether ‘the
nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion.’ ” See STARR,
supra note 13, at 19 (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S. at 142).
Dean Chemerinsky distilled four considerations to determine whether federal law
preempts the field.
First, is it an area where the federal government traditionally has played a
unique role? . . . Second, has Congress expressed an intent in the text of
the law or in the legislative history to have federal law be exclusive in the
area? . . . Third, would allowing state and local regulations in the area risk
interfering with comprehensive federal regulatory efforts? . . . Fourth, is
there an important traditional state or local interest served by the law?
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 13, at § 5.2.3, at 430–31.
35. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 402–03, 406–07, 409–11,
415–16 (2012) (holding that federal immigration law preempts state-made law on
immigration); United State v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108–09 (2000) (finding federal
dominance over maritime law means it field preempts any topical state law); Int’l
Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 490–91 (1987) (noting that federal Clean
Water Act contemplated minimal state role in policing interstate waterways); City of
Burbank, 411 U.S. at 633 (holding that FAA has full control over air craft noise).
36. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000)
(“When Congress intends federal law to ‘occupy the field,’ state law in that area is
preempted.” (quoting California v. ARC Amer. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 100 (1989))
(subsequent citation omitted)); Holk v. Snapple Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 336
(3d Cir. 2009) (“Field preemption occurs when state law occupies a ‘field reserved
for federal regulation’ . . . .” (quoting Locke, 529 U.S. at 111)); Abdullah v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 376 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that Congress may “occupy
a given field to the exclusion of state law” (quoting Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline
Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988))).
37. See STARR, supra note 13, at 19 (quoting Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc.,
373 U.S. at 142) (noting that field preemption consists of two prongs: “(1) whether
Congress has pervasively regulated with such global breadth as to leave no room
for competing centers of regulatory power, and (2) whether ‘the nature of the
regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion’ . . . .”).
38. 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999).
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encountered unexpected turbulence.39 The plaintiffs alleged the airline
attendants breached their duty of care by failing to give a verbal warning
after the captain turned on the “fasten seatbelt” sign.40 The Third Circuit
analyzed FAA in-flight regulations and determined that federal law governed in-flight safety standards so pervasively that any state law claim over
aviation safety must be field preempted.41 The Third Circuit was persuaded by the fact that a specific FAA regulation established a comprehensive standard of care for airline personnel that stated “[n]o person may
operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the
life or property of another.”42 The Abdullah court found a supplemental,
state-law based duty of care was unnecessary because the FAA identified an
appropriate safety standard that governed airline personnel uniformly.43
B. Remove Your Belt, Shoes, and Sense of Personal Space: Structure of
Premarket Approval Schemes
Federal premarket approval programs are a type of licensing scheme
that requires manufacturers in certain industries to prove to the federal
government that their product will work safely as advertised.44 Defendants
in products liability suits commonly put forth a “government standards
defense” that absolves the defendant of liability if they complied with federal regulations and the regulation preempts state law.45 The Supreme
39. See id. at 365 (explaining background and facts of case).
40. See id. at 365–66 (noting cause of action brought against defendant and
explaining that district court instructed jury on state law duty of care).
41. See id. at 365 (“Our finding on [implied field] preemption is based on our
determination that the FAA and relevant federal regulations establish complete
and thorough safety standards . . . .”).
42. See 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) (2017) (laying out general standard of care for
those operating aircrafts); see also Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 371 (discussing federal
regulation).
43. See Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 365 (“FAA and relevant federal regulations establish complete and thorough safety standards for interstate and international air
transportation and . . . these standards are not subject to supplementation . . . .”).
44. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 566 (2009) (describing premarket approval process as “most substantial” portion of Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics
Act); Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 344–45 (2001) (explaining premarket approval process within Medical Device Act); see also MCGARITY, supra note 2, at 23 (dichotomizing federal regulatory functions into
“standard setting and licensing,” wherein companies “must first obtain a permit or
a license from a regulatory agency” before taking their product to market);
Nagareda, supra note 3, at 8–12 (explaining “the regulatory framework” employed
by FDA to approve medical devices).
45. See MCGARITY, supra note 2, at 60 (“On the judicial front, federal preemption became the favored defense for regulated companies seeking to avoid liability
and accountability for harm caused by their products and activities.”); Grey, supra
note 17, at 562 (positing that issue of whether to sustain preemption defense could
mean difference between liability and absolution); Keith N. Hylton, Preemption and
Products Liability: A Positive Theory, 16 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 205, 210–11 (2008) (noting one author that has advocated that regulatory compliance defense could be
beneficial for society in certain industries); Noah, supra note 2, at 967–68 (develop-
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Court, however, has not accepted a blanket argument that premarket approval regulations broadly field preempt state duties of care; rather, the
Court looks for express congressional intent or conflict preemption to
find preemption.46 FDA and DOT regulations are examples that demonstrate how, in most instances, premarket approval regulations fail to
stretch as broadly as businesses facing liability would like.47
1. Food and Drug Administration Regulations
The FDA requires comprehensive approval processes before a company can bring a medical device or new pharmaceutical drug to market.48
These requirements include testing the product’s safety and effectiveness,
as well as labeling specifications.49 Once a company receives FDA approval it is prohibited from making further changes to the product without the Administration’s approval.50 FDA medical device regulations
ing theory of “government standards defense” that has not traditionally protected
companies from liability, but is increasingly immunizing them); see also Robert L.
Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049, 2053–54 (2000) (positing that if state courts begin to accept argument of adherence to federal regulations, then compliance defense could become more widely recognized). See
generally W. Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An Economic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 SETON HALL L. REV.
1437, 1475, 1478 (1994) (arguing that requirements to meet FDA premarket approval process are so comprehensive that state tort litigation is wasteful and federal
regulations are sufficient to protect consumers). This defense also gained congressional traction but was never signed into law. See Common Sense Product Liability
Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 956, 104th Cong. §§ 204–05 (1996) (vetoed by President
May 2, 1996) (providing for “FDA defense”); Product Liability Fairness Act, S. 640,
102d Cong. § 303(c)(1) (1991) (providing punitive damages would not be
awarded in cases involving drugs given premarket approval by FDA).
46. See infra notes 52–69 and accompanying text for an explanation of cases
litigating preemptive effect of federal premarket approval programs.
47. See, e.g., Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d 253, 265–66 (3d Cir. 2008),
cert. granted and judgment vacated, 556 U.S. 1101 (2009) (remanding for further
consideration in light of Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009)); see infra notes
48–75 and accompanying text for background on premarket approval regulations
and cases that interpret them.
48. See generally 21 U.S.C. § 360c (2012) (detailing “Class I,” “Class II,” and
“Class III” medical devices); 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2012) (codifying 1976 medical device amendment to Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act).
49. See MCGARITY, supra note 2, at 79–80 (explaining how 1979 Medical Device Amendment to Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act gave FDA ability to oversee sale
and production of medical devices through approval schemes); Nagareda, supra
note 3, at 8–10 (discussing regulatory framework employed by FDA).
50. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 319 (2008) (noting that FDA
will send “approvable letter” when device could be approved with more information or agreed upon restrictions and that FDA is able to set device modification
limits (citing 21 C.F.R. § 814.44e (2016))); see also Michael D. Green & William B.
Schultz, Tort Law Deference to FDA Regulation of Medical Devices, 88 GEO. L.J. 2119,
2136–37 (2000) (explaining that to meet premarket approval standards, pharmaceutical manufacturers must produce two controlled clinical studies, while medical
device companies must submit two independent studies). See generally 21 U.S.C.
§ 360e (describing premarket approval process for medical devices); Premarket Ap-
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contain an express preemption clause that specifically prohibits states
from requiring manufacturers to comply with alternate specifications that
deviate from federal law.51
The Third Circuit encountered FDA pharmaceutical labeling regulations in Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc.,52 wherein the plaintiff alleged a state failure-to-warn claim based on a drug label’s exclusion of particular side
effects.53 Colacicco applied conflict preemption principles to analyze the
issue due to “the lack of a Congressional directive expressly approving or
rejecting preemption in the context of drug labeling . . . .”54 FDA pharmaceutical labeling regulations require that before a drug is put on the
market, the FDA must approve the labeling and any subsequent changes
to the label based on new risks.55 The Third Circuit determined that the
practical effect of these regulations made it impossible for pharmaceutical
companies to comply with both state and federal law if a state required any
labeling requirements in addition to FDA rules.56 Thus, the Colacicco
court determined that state failure-to-warn claims challenging labeling veracity were conflict preempted.57
Colacicco was ultimately vacated by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Wyeth v. Levine.58 The Court in Wyeth held state failure-to-warn claims
could survive a preemption challenge when the drug company had the
ability to make unilateral labeling changes outside the FDA’s approval process.59 In form, Colacicco was correct because the Wyeth Court also applied
proval (PMA), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/medicaldevices/de
viceregulationandguidance/howtomarketyourdevice/premarketsubmissions/pre
marketapprovalpma/ [https://perma.cc/N9SB-NT8Z] (last visited Feb. 25, 2017)
(same).
51. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2012) (noting that generally no state shall impose requirements on medical devices that depart from federal requirements); see
also Riegel, 552 U.S. at 321–22 (noting express preemption clause and considering
whether plaintiff’s claims are preempted by statute).
52. 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. granted and judgment vacated, 556 U.S.
1101 (2009) (remanding for further consideration in light of Wyeth v. Levine, 555
U.S. 555 (2009)).
53. See Colacicco, 521 F.3d at 256–57 (explaining background facts of case).
54. See id. at 266 (“It follows that in this case, which is also one of conflict
preemption, the lack of a Congressional directive expressly approving or rejecting
preemption in the context of drug labeling regulations is not determinative.
Rather, the conflict preemption analysis is designed to determine the proprietary
of preemption where Congress has not explicitly stated its intent.”).
55. See id. at 268 (discussing FDA regulations dealing with pharmaceutical
labeling).
56. See id. at 268–69, 271 (indicating that being forced to comply with extraneous state regulations would trigger “misbranding” violation under federal law).
57. See id. at 271, 276 (acquiescing to FDA’s analysis of situation and finding
state law sufficiently conflict preempted).
58. See Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 556 U.S. 1101 (2009) (vacating judgment
and remanding for further consideration in light of Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555
(2009)).
59. See Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 571–73 (explaining that it was in fact possible for
pharmaceutical company to change labeling without clearance from FDA, particu-
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conflict preemption principles to reach its outcome; however, the Third
Circuit’s holding in Colacicco was overturned based on its substantive outcome.60 Conversely, in both Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett61 and
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing,62 the Court determined that when FDA regulations
do not permit labeling exceptions to generic drugs, any heightened state
standard is preempted because it is impossible to depart from FDA regulations without violating federal law.63 Thus, the Supreme Court considers
actual impossibility a dispositive indicator of conflict preemption in the
pharmaceutical labeling arena.64
The Supreme Court has also determined that federal law does not
trigger field preemption in the medical device context.65 In Medtronic,
Inc. v. Lohr,66 the Court determined that a state law imposing requirements on medical devices is only preempted “where a particular state requirement threatens to interfere with a specific federal interest.”67 The
Court in Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc.68 subsequently drew on Lohr to hold that
states are not prohibited from implementing “parallel” requirements to
federal law as long as the state requirements do not directly conflict in a
way that makes compliance impossible.69 Both cases demonstrate that
larly when updating labeling to reflect changes in safety information would be
reasonable).
60. See infra notes 130–32 and accompanying text for an explanation of how
the Third Circuit in Colacicco applied the right rules to decide its case but was
overturned based on its outcome.
61. 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013).
62. 564 U.S. 604 (2011).
63. See id. at 624 (reasoning that because generic drug manufacturers must
request permission from FDA to alter chemistry of their drug, pharmaceutical
company could not concurrently comply with heightened state standard without
also violating federal law); see also Mut. Pharm. Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2476–78 (finding
that because it is impossible for pharmaceutical manufacturer to comply with both
state and federal law, state law must be preempted and generally drawing on
PLIVA).
64. Compare Mut. Pharm. Co., 133 S. Ct. at 2476–78 (finding actual impossibility), with Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 570–71 (finding dual compliance was possible).
65. See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008) (holding that
“[s]tate requirements are pre-empted under the [Medical Device Act] only to the
extent they are ‘different from, or in addition to’ the requirements imposed by
federal law” (citation omitted)); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 508 (1996)
(lacking evidence to find Congress or FDA intended to “occupy entire field” of
medical device regulation).
66. 518 U.S. 470 (1996).
67. See id. at 500 (“Although we do not believe [§ 360(k)] necessarily precludes ‘general’ federal requirements from ever pre-empting state requirements . . . it is impossible to ignore its overarching concern that pre-emption occur
only where a particular state requirement threatens to interfere with a specific
federal interest.”).
68. 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
69. See id. at 330 (“Thus, § 360k does not prevent a State from providing a
damages remedy for claims premised on a violation of FDA regulations; the state
duties in such a case ‘parallel,’ rather than add to, federal requirements.” (citations omitted)). See generally Elliot Sheppard Tarloff, Note, Medical Devices and Pre-
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conflict preemption can only result when the two laws are directly at
odds.70
2. Department of Transportation Premarket Approval
During the 1980s and 1990s, the DOT permitted car manufacturers to
employ a variety of passive restraint devices to induce both manufacturers
and consumers to adopt air bags over time.71 A number of states, however, found that their common law tort doctrine mandated air bags be
installed in cars for the manufacturer to fulfill its duty of care.72 The Supreme Court in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.73 determined that the
stricter state law requirement sufficiently conflicted and presented a policy
obstacle to the achievement of federal objectives.74 It was this direct conflict between both standards of care and policy goals that made it impossible for the car manufacturer to comply with both state and federal law.75
III. NO ROOM IN THE OVERHEAD COMPARTMENT: THE THIRD CIRCUIT
FINDS STATE PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIMS ARE NOT IMPLIEDLY
PREEMPTED BY FAA REGULATIONS
Sikkelee presented the Third Circuit with the issue of whether the FAA
premarket approval process broadly preempted state products liability
emption: A Defense of Parallel Claims Based on Violations of Non-Device Specific
Regulations, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1196, 1210 (2011) (explaining implied preemption
arguments applying “parallel” rule set forth in Riegel).
70. See Riegel, 552 U.S. at 334–35 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that
when Congress is not specific about preemption in its statutory text, then courts
should opt for readings that disfavor preemption or find preemption narrowly); see
also Issacharoff & Sharkey, supra note 3, at 203–04 (noting that Lohr declined to
find broad field preemption and hesitated to completely displace tort law).
71. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 864–65 (2000) (discussing background of DOT regulations); see also MCGARITY, supra note 2, at 61–65
(discussing Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Act that empowered federal National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration to promulgate vehicle design standards).
See generally 49 U.S.C. § 30101 (2012) (enumerating provisions of Motor Vehicle
Safety Act); O’REILLY, supra note 13, at 196 (providing background of regulations
that triggered Geier).
72. See Geier, 529 U.S. at 866 (noting cases from New York, Ohio, Arizona,
Indiana, and New Hampshire required car manufacturers to comply with stricter
duty than federal law permitted, but noting First, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit
Courts of Appeal found preemption of state law).
73. 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
74. See id. at 869, 873, 881, 886 (explaining that first, presence of savings
clause took statute out of express preemption consideration and then applying
implied preemption principles to find state law requirements of air bags were
preempted).
75. See id. at 881 (classifying analysis as obstacle preemption, because disagreement was at policy level, rather than outright impossibility of dual compliance); see also Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 63–64 (2002) (deciding
similar case to Geier involving premarket regulations of watercraft and finding that
absent express preemption, conflict preemption principles should apply (citing
Geier, 529 U.S. at 869)).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017

15

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 3

542

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62: p. 527

claims.76 The Sikkelee court answered this question in the negative and
applied a standardized framework to navigate premarket approval preemption questions.77 Section III(A) will present the facts of Sikkelee and its
path to the Third Circuit.78 Section III(B) will then describe the Third
Circuit’s application of its preemption framework through a narrative
analysis.79
A. Please Check Your Bag: Facts and Procedure
In Sikkelee, a widow brought a products liability claim following her
husband’s tragic death in an airplane crash.80 Her complaint alleged that
the Textron Lycoming engine installed in the small aircraft piloted by her
husband allowed raw fuel to leak from the carburetor into the engine,
causing the plane to lose power and crash shortly after takeoff.81 Every
airplane part is subject to an extensive FAA approval process where the
manufacturer must submit various design plans and preform airworthiness
tests to receive a “type certificate,” which is official FAA approval to sell the
part.82 In defense to Sikkelee’s claims, Precision Airmotive (Precision) ar76. See Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 685–87 (3d Cir.
2016) (citing Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating
that district court found federal standard of care based on FAA premarket approval regulations, but that finding engendered novel questions regarding how far
Abdullah extended over state products liability claims), cert. denied, AVCO Corp. v.
Sikkelee, 137 S. Ct. 495 (2016).
77. See id. at 709 (“[T]he District Court erred in granting summary judgment
on Sikkelee’s design defect claims on the basis of field preemption.”); see also infra
notes 86–118 and accompanying text for a narrative analysis of how the Third
Circuit arrived at its framework that state products liability claims should be tested
against express and conflict preemption, not field preemption.
78. For a further discussion of the facts and procedure of Sikkelee, see infra
notes 80–85 and accompanying text.
79. See infra notes 91–118 and accompanying text for the three main portions
of the court’s analysis in Sikkelee, which first defines the scope of Abdullah, then
applies express preemption to the FAA premarket regulations, and finally considers whether the second part of that analysis should be conducted with conflict or
field preemption principles.
80. See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 685 (explaining accident that gave rise to claim).
81. See id. (“Plaintiff-Appellant in this case, alleges that the aircraft lost power
and crashed as a result of a malfunction or defect in the engine’s carburetor . . . .
‘[D]ue to the faulty design of the lock tab washers as well as gasket set,’ vibrations
from the engine loosened screwed holding the carburetor’s throttle body to its
float bowl. When properly functioning, a carburetor regulates the mixture of fuel
and air that enters the engine’s cylinders.” (citation omitted)).
82. See 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a)(1) (2012) (“The Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration shall . . . [proscribe] minimum standards required in the
interest of safety for appliances and for the design, material . . . of aircraft, aircraft
engines, and propellers.”).
Aircraft engine manufactures must obtain (1) a type certificate, which certifies that a new design for an aircraft or aircraft part performs properly
and meets the safety standards defined in aviation regulations, and (2) a
production certificate, which certifies that a duplicate part produced for a
particular plane will conform to the design in the type certificate . . .
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gued that Abdullah preempted the entire field of aviation regulation and,
moreover, because it complied with the FAA’s type certificate program the
company was not liable.83 On a motion for summary judgment, the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania agreed
that Abdullah should be interpreted broadly and that a federal standard of
care should apply to aviation products liability claims; however, the district
court also pointed out the impossibility of fashioning jury instructions
based on FAA regulations because they “were never intended to create
federal standards of care.”84 Stuck between two contradictory conclusions, the district court certified the issue of whether FAA regulations preempt state product liability law for appeal.85
B. Fees, Fees, and More Fees: The Third Circuit Holds Premarket Approval
Regulations Are Subject to Traditional Conflict Preemption Principles
On appeal, Precision raised three express and field preemption arguments, each of which argued that the FAA has expansive power over state
law.86 First, Precision argued Abdullah was controlling because the Third
Circuit previously found the FAA to have broad field preemption power
[and] (3) an airworthiness certificate, which certifies that the plane and its
component parts conform to its type certificate and are in condition for
safe operation.
Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 684 (emphasis in original) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 44704(a), (c),
(d) (2012)). Obtaining a type certificate could require “300,000 drawings, 2,000
engineering reports . . . approximately 80 ground tests and 1,600 hours of flight
tests.” See id. at 684 (citing United Sates v. S.A. Empresa de Ciacao Aerea Rio
Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 808 n.7 (1984)). The extent of the
FAA’s review of these submissions must ensure the product “is properly designed
and manufactured, performs properly, and meets the regulations and minimum
standards prescribed under § 44701(a)” of the Act. See 49 U.S.C. § 44704(a)(1); see
also 14 C.F.R. § 21.31 (2016) (explaining requirements of type design); 14 C.F.R.
§ 21.137 (2016) (explaining requirements of quality system). After complying with
this arduous premarket approval process, an airplane part manufacturer can produce its product and bring it to market. See 49 U.S.C. § 44704(a).
83. See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 683 (explaining that on motion for summary judgment, defendant argued that Abdullah was controlling).
84. See Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 45 F. Supp.3d 431, 447–48, 437
n.4 (M.D. Pa. 2014) (noting that Abdullah should be applied because of its transitive applicability, but lamenting general difficulty of fashioning regulations into
legal standard of care (quoting Pease v. Lycoming Engines, No. 4:10-CV-00843,
2011 WL 6339833, at *22 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 19, 2011), overruled by, 822 F.3d 608 (3d
Cir. 2016))).
85. See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 686–87 (“Faced with this conundrum, the District
Court ordered Sikkelee to submit additional briefing . . . and invited Lycoming to
file a motion for summary judgment.”).
86. See id. at 688, 691, 698 (arguing that (1) Abdullah controlled and FAA
regulations field preempted state law, (2) FAA statute and regulations expressly
preempted state law, and (3) FAA regulations field preempted state law); see also id.
at 707–08 (noting that parties both raised various policy arguments but that court
merely addressed them for completeness rather than for their dispositive nature).
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over state law.87 Second, it argued the enabling FAA statute and its
premarket approval regulations expressly preempted state products liability claims.88 Finally, Precision argued, even if FAA rules do not explicitly
preempt state law, they nonetheless are so pervasive that field preemption
is the logical result.89 The Third Circuit rejected all of Precision’s arguments, holding that state products liability claims are not preempted by
premarket approval processes, unless (a) Congress expressly intended preemption, or (b) “traditional conflict preemption principles” led to the
conclusion that it is impossible to concurrently comply with both state and
federal obligations.90
1. In-Flight Versus on the Ground: Distinguishing Abdullah
The Sikkelee court distinguished Abdullah by finding that its applicability was limited only to “in-flight” operations by “drawing a line between
what happens during the flight and what happens upon disembarking.”91
FAA regulations regarding in-flight protocol were comprehensive enough
to establish a federal duty of care that left no room for supplemental state
standards.92 Those same provisions employed in Abdullah, however, were
not tailored to apply to a products liability claim over an airplane part.93
87. See id. at 688–89 (noting that defendant argued Abdullah is controlling
due to its broad scope and held FAA regulations broadly preempt all state law that
touches on aviation safety); see also infra notes 91–93 and accompanying text for
the Third Circuit’s analysis of why Abdullah is distinguishable from Sikkelee.
88. See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 691–95 (countering defendant’s argument that
FAA’s statutory framework and its corresponding regulations constituted “clear
and manifest” congressional intent to preempt state laws touching on aviation
safety); see also infra notes 94–101 and accompanying text for a further explanation
of why the Third Circuit found the defendant overvalued the text of the FAA statute and regulation to ultimately find no such congressional intent was present.
89. See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 698–706 (explaining defendant’s argument that
FAA premarket approval regulations field preempt state law misunderstands Supreme Court precedent that applies conflict preemption principles to premarket
approval schemes); see also infra notes 102–18 and accompanying text for an explanation of Sikkelee’s logic that holds if broad express preemption argument fails,
then the challenger must move to a narrower conflict preemption argument.
90. See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 695 (“[A]bsent clear evidence that Congress intended the mere issuance of a type certificate to foreclose all design defect claims,
state tort suits using state standards of care may proceed subject only to traditional
conflict preemption principles.”); see also infra notes 102–18 and accompanying
text for the Third Circuit’s reasoning that its rule is consistent with Supreme Court
cases on premarket approval.
91. See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 688–89 (noting that while Abdullah broadly preempted “the ‘field of aviation safety’ ” that decision was limited to “in-air operations” (quoting Abdullah v. Amer. Airlines, 181 F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 1999))).
92. See id. at 689 (explaining that in-air regulations provided “catch-all standard of care”); supra notes 42–43 and accompanying text for the standard of care
the Abdullah court applied and derived from federal regulations.
93. See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 689, 693 (pointing out that regulations addressed
in Abdullah are completely different from type certificate regulations at issue in
Sikkelee). Compare 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) (2017) (laying out general standard of care
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2. Show Your Ticket at the Gate: Part One of Sikkelee’s Framework Considers
Express Preemption
After distinguishing Abdullah, the Sikkelee court applied part one of its
premarket approval preemption framework and considered whether Congress or the FAA expressly intended preemption.94 Precision failed to
convince the Third Circuit that either the FAA enabling statute or the type
certificate regulations demonstrated “a clear and manifest” express intent
to preempt.95 The overarching FAA statute declares that the FAA is tasked
with setting “minimum standards” for the construction of airplane components and also contains a savings clause, which states that any remedy in
the statute is in addition to relief provided by state law.96 Statutory language containing a “minimum standards” and a savings clause have previously been found to be “insufficient on [their] own to support a finding of
clear and manifest intent to preemption.”97
Additionally, the language of the FAA’s type certificate program
lacked the utility to be used as a comprehensive standard of care.98 The
Third Circuit found the regulations “devoid” of express intent to preempt
because the regulations merely embodied “procedures for manufacturers
to obtain certain approvals” and were no more than benchmarks to meet
the requirements to receive a type certificate.99 In contrast, the regulations in Abdullah were comprehensive enough to find field preemption
because they established a general standard of behavior of airline personnel that could easily be applied to a variety of similar cases, whereas type
certificate procedures establish discrete, minimum standards for airplane
for those operating aircrafts), with 14 C.F.R. § 21.31 (2016) (explaining requirements of type design).
94. See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 689–90 (beginning analysis by applying presumption against preemption by identifying that state law has governed aviation torts
since at least 1914); supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text for a background
explanation of the presumption against preemption.
95. See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 687 (explaining that because of states’ historical
role in governing tort law, “clear and manifest” intent must be shown that Congress intended preemption of federal aviation torts (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 555
U.S. 555, 565 (2009))); infra notes 97–101 and accompanying text for a further
explanation of the Third Circuit’s rejection of Precision’s express preemption
argument.
96. See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 692–93 (“While the inclusion of the savings clause
‘is not inconsistent’ with a requirement that courts apply federal standards of care
when adjudicating state law claims, it belies Appellees’ argument that Congress
demonstrated a clear and manifest intent to preempt state law products liability
claims altogether.” (citing Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 374–75)); see also supra note 14 and
accompanying text for background explanation of savings clauses.
97. See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 692 (citing Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v.
Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 145 (1963)).
98. See id. at 693 (reasoning that one primary difference between Sikkelee and
Abdullah was that regulations governing flight personnel presented workable standard of care that applied reasonable person test).
99. See id. at 694 (determining that none of regulatory language at issue indicated that it was intended to supply general duty of care).
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part design.100 Thus, part one of Sikkelee’s test was not met because
neither Congress nor the FAA intended to expressly preempt state products liability claims.101
3. Holding Pattern on the Tarmac: The Third Circuit Applies Traditional
Conflict Preemption Principles
Precision then argued that, nevertheless, the premarket approval regulations implicitly field preempt state standards of care.102 The Third Circuit disagreed with this premise, stating “absent clear evidence that
Congress intended the mere issuance of a type certificate to foreclose all
design defect claims, state tort suits using state standards of care may proceed subject only to traditional conflict preemption principles.”103 To test
part two of its framework, the Third Circuit considered “analogous statutory regimes” and similar premarket approval processes.104
Sikkelee found that DOT premarket approval regulations were sufficiently similar to the relevant FAA procedures.105 In Geier, the Court
noted that the relevant statute authorized the agency to promulgate minimum standards and it contained a savings clause—just like the Federal
Aviation Act.106 Similarly, the Geier Court steered away from conducting a
field preemption analysis and instead applied conflict preemption principles because it was apparent that the structure of each statute envisioned
100. Compare 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a) (2017) (laying out general standard of care
for those operating aircrafts), with 14 C.F.R. § 21.137 (2016) (laying out specific
requirements that each applicant for type certificate must meet).
101. See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 695 (finding that FAA type certificate regulations
were never intended by their promulgators to ever provide general standard of
care for tort claims). The Third Circuit tested this conclusion by comparing the
FAA to the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA). See id. (explaining
Third Circuit’s comparison of FAA to GARA). GARA created a statute of repose
that bars suits against aviation manufacturers more than eighteen years following
an accident. See id. By enacting a statute of repose, Congress necessarily intended
to allow claims to be brought against manufacturers within that eighteen-year window. See id. GARA would be rendered “superfluous” if preemption was found. See
id.
102. See id. at 699 (noting that Precision put forth three arguments that Congress intended for FAA regulations to broadly field preempt state products liability
law based on analogous statutory regimes, Supreme Court’s premarket approval
cases, and other Appeals Courts that have found field preemption in aviation
safety).
103. See id. at 695 (emphasis added) (outlining Third Circuit’s
disagreement).
104. See id. at 699, 701–02 (comparing FAA regulations to FDA and DOT regulations and drawing comparison between Supreme Court’s previous premarket
approval cases); see also infra notes 105–18 and accompanying text for a detailed
analysis of the comparisons.
105. See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 699 (noting statutory similarities between transportation and aviation regulations).
106. See id. (noting that National Traffic and Motor Safety Act of 1966 possessed similarities to FAA Act); see also id. at 699–701 (citing Sprietsma v. Mercury
Marine, 537 U.S. 51, 57, 63 (2002)) (comparing FAA to Federal Boat Safety Act).
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concurrent regulation unless the two standards—state and federal—made
compliance impossible.107
The Third Circuit additionally compared its rule to the Supreme
Court’s cases on medical devices and pharmaceutical labeling.108 The
Court found that both Bartlett and PLIVA suggest that a premarket approval program only preempts state law when compliance with the two
standards is impossible because complying with one would violate the
other.109 Consequently, state law will likely be conflict preempted when
the relevant federal regulations do not provide a design exception;
whereas state and federal law can coexist when federal law provides the
manufacturer with some design flexibility.110
A comparison to Riegel and Lohr confirmed Sikkelee’s application of
conflict principles to premarket approval schemes.111 In Riegel, the Supreme Court found preemption primarily because of an express preemption clause that displaced state law—an aspect missing from the Federal
Aviation Act.112 When read together, both Riegel and Lohr find that the
“ ‘overarching concern’ of the [premarket approval scheme] was ensuring
‘that pre-emption occur only where a particular state requirement threatens to interfere with a specific federal interest.’ ”113 The preemptory role
of premarket approval regulations is narrow and is only invoked when
compliance with state and federal standards is impossible.114 Lohr made
107. See id. at 700–01 (citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861,
875 (2000) (explaining that Geier stands for proposition that when dealing with
premarket approval regulations courts should apply traditional conflict preemption principles, not field); supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text for a discussion of Geier.
108. See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 701–05 (comparing its rule, in detail, to Supreme
Court cases on pharmaceutical labeling and medical device regulations).
109. See id. at 703 (citing Mut. Pharm. Co., Inc. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466,
2473 (2013) and PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 624 (2011)) (comparing
cases dealing with generic versus brand-name drug labeling); see also supra notes
61–64 and accompanying text discussing Bartlett and PLIVA.
110. See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 703–04 (explaining that impossibility results when
“a party cannot ‘independently do under federal law what state law requires of it’ ”
(citing PLIVA, 564 U.S. at 604 and Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373
U.S. 132, 142–43 (1973))).
111. See id. 704–05 (explaining that when both cases are read together, they
“[cut] against a finding of field preemption” (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518
U.S. 470, 497, 500–01 (1997) and Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330
(2008))); see also supra notes 65–70 and accompanying text for background explanation of Lohr and Riegel.
112. See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 704 (distinguishing FDA’s statutory scheme from
FAA’s statutory scheme).
113. See id. (explaining that this “overarching concern” was to preserve state
common law requirements that are equal to or identical to federal standards (citing Lohr, 518 U.S. at 497, 500–01)).
114. See id. (emphasizing through comparison of Lohr and Riegel that conflict
preemption should only be found when dual compliance is truly impossible).
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this clear by preserving state duties that run “parallel” to federal
requirements.115
Precision failed to make a conflict preemption argument, opting for
an expansive field preemption theory.116 This restricted Precision doctrinally because it ignored both the Supreme Court’s and Third Circuit’s
applications of conflict principles to premarket approval regulations.117
Thus, the Third Circuit limited its holding to the conclusion that FAA
regulations do not establish a standard of care for tort actions and the type
certificate is only subject to traditional conflict preemption principles.118
IV. FIRST CLASS UPGRADE: CONSIDERING SIKKELEE’S COMPATIBILITY
THIRD CIRCUIT PRECEDENT AND ITS VALUE FOR LITIGATORS

WITH

The Sikkelee court based the root of its framework in Supreme Court
cases addressing premarket approval preemption; however, the methodology of Sikkelee’s rule was articulated ostensibly through Fellner and Colacicco.119 The following analysis will demonstrate how Sikkelee’s approach
resulted in a unification of the Third Circuit’s prior premarket approval
preemption cases.120 Then, this section will offer advice to Third Circuit
litigators on how to employ Sikkelee’s framework.121
115. See id. at 704–05 (explaining that Lohr and Riegel’s “parallel” requirement
rule was sufficient and Third Circuit saw “no justification for going further than
the Supreme Court” on conflict preemption principles); see also supra note 69 and
accompanying text for a background explanation of the “parallel” exception.
116. See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 702 (explaining that because defendant did not
raise conflict preemption argument in its brief, Third Circuit’s holding could only
go as far as reversing district court’s summary judgment motion and remanding
for further litigation on conflict preemption); see also infra note 123 and accompanying text for an explanation of why the FAA in its amicus brief was the one who
actually raised the conflict preemption argument.
117. See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 702 (noting that scope of issues raised by plaintiff
and defendant did not require Third Circuit to “demarcate boundaries” of conflict
preemption regarding premarket approval processes).
118. See id. (“[W]e hold only that, consistent with the FAA’s view, type certification does not itself establish or satisfy the relevant standard of care for tort actions, nor does it evince congressional intent to preempt the field of products
liability; rather, because the type certification process results in the FAA’s preapproval of particular specifications from which a manufacturer may not normally
deviate without violating federal law, the type certificate bears on ordinary conflict
preemption principles.” (citation omitted)).
119. See supra notes 28–32, 52–57 and accompanying text for background discussion of Fellner and Colacicco; see also infra 127–133 and accompanying text for
critical analysis of how principles developed in Fellner and Colacicco translate into
understanding Sikkelee.
120. See infra notes 122–33 and accompanying text for a synthesis of Third
Circuit case law on premarket approval preemption.
121. See infra notes 134–41 and accompanying text for an analysis of how practitioners can integrate Sikkelee into their arguments.
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A. More Leg Room, Less Problems: Sikkelee’s Methodology Synthesizes
Previous Third Circuit Premarket Approval Preemption Cases
In addition to considering Precision’s expansive field preemption argument, the Sikkelee court also considered the FAA’s amicus brief.122 The
FAA argued that the preemption analysis should be considered in two,
intertwined layers: the first layer is that the FAA broadly field preempts
state law in aviation safety, and the second is “to the extent that a plaintiff
challenges an aspect of an aircraft’s design that was expressly approved by
the FAA . . . a plaintiff’s tort suit” would be conflict preempted.123 The
Third Circuit observed that on one end of the implied preemption spectrum was Precision’s argument—broad field preemption if a federal regulation is generally on point—while the FAA’s layered approach formed the
other end of the spectrum.124 However, Sikkelee’s premarket approval preemption framework explains that the proper analysis should be between
the two ends of this spectrum because conflict principles—not field preemption—should only be applied in premarket approval analyses.125 The
outcome in Sikkelee and analyses in Fellner and Colacicco demonstrate that
the Third Circuit takes a narrow approach to implied preemption by viewing conflict and field preemption as distinct concepts.126

122. See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 702 (quoting FAA amicus brief); see also id. (explaining that FAA raised conflict preemption argument before either named party
did).
123. See id. (quoting Letter Brief for FAA at 10–11, Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 822 F.3d 860 (3d Cir. 2016) (No. 14-4193)).
124. See id. at 705 n.22 (citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co. 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5
(1990) (discussing whether field and conflict preemption are distinct sets of rules).
The FAA pointed to the English footnote for the justification of their layered approach, which posits that conflict preemption is necessarily contained in field preemption. See FAA Letter Brief at 6, 10–11, 822 F.3d 860 (3d Cir. 2016) (No. 144193). The FAA’s layered approach could potentially be justified by the peculiar
wording in the footnote in English; however, the Third Circuit explicitly disagrees
with this characterization and views conflict and field preemption as distinct concepts, despite being subsets of implied preemption. See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 705
n.22 (explaining that in practice, courts view conflict and field preemption as separate because different rules govern their application).
125. See id. at 704–05 (explaining that based on its reading of Supreme Court
precedent, premarket approval regulations should be subject to traditional conflict
preemption principles, absent express preemption clause); see also supra note 114
and accompanying text for a discussion of how Sikkelee interprets conflict preemption as a narrow outcome compared to the broader field preemption; supra notes
23–27 & 33–37 and accompanying text for background explanation of how the
Supreme Court and the Third Circuit have traditionally applied separate rules and
cases to analyze conflict and field preemption.
126. See infra notes 127–33 and accompanying text for further analysis of how
Sikkelee’s narrow view of conflict preemption reduces the instances of preemption
in the premarket approval context.
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The substantive basis for Sikkelee’s framework is found in Fellner.127
Fellner demonstrated that the Third Circuit found it imperative that first,
the federal government had officially regulated in the issue area and second, that any conflict between state and federal law is real.128 Sikkelee embodies this reasoning because its analysis was targeted at whether the FAA
truly spoke to a purposeful preemption of state products liability
claims.129
The structure of Sikkelee’s premarket approval preemption framework
is echoed in Colacicco.130 The Colacicco court’s mode of analysis was completely on point because it applied conflict preemption principles after a
determination that FDA regulations did not expressly preempt state
law.131 In that way, Sikkelee is a vindication of Colacicco whose analytical
rule was nullified based on its substantive outcome.132 Sikkelee brings together the reasoning of Fellner and Colacicco to construct a premarket approval preemption framework that is both doctrinally rigid, because it
obeys Supreme Court precedent, and sufficiently flexible to give Third
Circuit courts and litigators an analytical framework to apply to preemption cases.133
127. See Fellner v. Tri-Union Seafoods, L.L.C., 539 F.3d 237, 248–49 (3d Cir.
2008) (explaining that applying conflict preemption principles was only logical
analytical method in premarket approval context cases).
128. See id. at 256 (reasoning that evidence federal government chose not to
regulate in certain area was not grounds for inference that it intended conflict
preemption to result); see also Gasaway & Parrish, supra note 23, at 220 (“Courts
have increasingly recognized that when federal decision makers make an affirmative judgment in favor of a certain, optimum level of regulation . . . that judgments
operates as a negative judgment on state law . . . .” (emphasis in original)); supra
notes 31–32 and accompanying text for an explanation of the Third Circuit’s application of conflict preemption principles in Fellner.
129. See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 693–95, 702–04 (identifying that core of analysis
revolved around fact that neither Congress nor FAA intended for its type certificate program to preempt state products liability claims and demonstrating that
holding through application of both express and conflict preemption).
130. See Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d 253, 265 (3d Cir. 2008) (analyzing
pharmaceutical labeling issue by first applying express preemption principles, but
then determining case involved application of conflict preemption), cert. granted
and judgment vacated, 556 U.S. 1101 (2009) (vacating judgment and remanding for
further consideration in light of Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009)).
131. See Colacicco, 521 F.3d at 265 (“It follows that in this case, which is one of
conflict preemption, the lack of Congressional directive expressly approving or
rejecting preemption in the context of drug labeling regulations is not determinative. Rather, the conflict preemption analysis is designed to determine the propriety of preemption where Congress has not explicitly stated its intent.”).
132. See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text explaining that Colacicco
was overturned based on its outcome, which held FDA labeling regulations preempted state law when the Supreme Court held otherwise, but that the Supreme
Court duplicated its application of conflict preemption rules.
133. See supra notes 7 & 90 and accompanying text explaining the premarket
approval preemption framework that Sikkelee crafted; cf. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences
LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449 (2005) (“[W]e have long presumed that Congress does not
cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.”).
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B. Read the Safety Manual Before Departure: Advice to Third Circuit Counsel
Arguing for Preemption
Sikkelee’s framework states federal premarket approval regulations will
only carry a preemptive effect if there is an express preemption provision
in the relevant statute or regulation, or compliance with both federal and
state regulations is impossible.134 Counsel arguing in favor of preemption
should avoid making broad field preemption arguments when dealing
with premarket approval processes because regulations are highly technical and too specific to form a general standard of care.135 Rather, litigators should make a textual, express preemption argument followed by a
conflict preemption argument that proves dual compliance is impossible.136 Bartlett, PLIVA, and Fellner demonstrate the granular level at which
conflict preemption arguments can successfully be made.137
C. Place Your Seat in Its Upright Position: Advice to Third Circuit Counsel
Countering Preemption
Sikkelee is a favorable case to plaintiffs attempting to state a claim of
products liability because it establishes that federal premarket approval
processes narrowly preempt state law.138 Any counterargument to federal
preemption in such cases should emphasize that federal and state law
must be in actual conflict, not just hypothetically conflicting or through
broad policy differences.139 Counsel arguing against preemption should
also stress the parallel state and federal regulation exception developed in
134. See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 695 (explaining premise of premarket approval
preemption framework); see also supra notes 94–118 and accompanying text for an
explanation of how Sikkelee applied its framework and how the Third Circuit justified it doctrinally.
135. Compare Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 694 (discussing how FAA type certificate regulations are highly specific and technical), with Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, 181 F.3d
363, 371 (3d Cir. 1999) (explaining that FAA regulation governing airline personnel was akin to reasonable person standard).
136. See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 692–93 (beginning analysis by looking to text of
statute to determine whether Congress evinced express intent to preempt state
products liability law).
137. See supra notes 28–32 & 61–64 and accompanying text for an explanation
of how in each case the respective courts reasoned that conflict preemption could
only be successful when compliance with both federal and state standards was practically impossible.
138. See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 709 (overturning district court’s grant of summary
judgment and remanding for review of plaintiff’s products liability claim against
airplane part manufacturer). See generally MCGARITY, supra note 2, at 30–34 (arguing that state common law claims are proper way to hold companies who manufacturer defective products accountable).
139. See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 688 (noting that conflict preemption requires
actual impossibility of dual compliance); see also Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,
Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 884 (2000) (citing English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–79
(1990) (explaining that conflict preemption requires actual conflict, not just generalized intent to preempt).
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Riegel and Lohr, which was emphasized in Sikkelee.140 The more an argument demonstrates ability of dual compliance through symmetrical standards the less likely a court is to find conflict preemption.141
V. CLEARED FOR TAKEOFF: SIKKELEE’S IMPACT
PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIMS

ON

Sikkelee is a victory for states’ rights advocates and opponents of national tort liability standards because the opinion developed a clear line of
delineation between the scope of federal premarket approval processes
and the states’ historic role in compensating injured citizens.142 Moreover, the Third Circuit’s synthesis of case law on premarket approval regulations produced a cogent framework that standardizes implied preemption
analysis for both courts and litigators.143 Sikkelee’s reassertion of state police power marks a commitment to federalist principles to the benefit of
aggrieved plaintiffs.144
140. See Sikkelee, 822 F.3d at 705 (explaining that “parallel” exception means
that states are permitted to regulate concurrently to federal law).
141. See id. (noting that Supreme Court tolerates parallel regimes). Compare
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 330 (2008) (explaining that when manufacturer can independently make changes to product, then it is possible to comply
with both federal and state law), with PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. 604, 620
(2011) (finding state law is preempted where party cannot “independently do
under federal law what state law requires of it”).
142. See supra note 118 and accompanying text for a quote of the Sikkelee holding that overturns the dismissal of the plaintiff’s products liability complaint. See
generally MCGARITY, supra note 2, at 21–22 (explaining preemption in premarket
approval context is vacillation between avoiding liability and holding companies
responsible for defective products). But see Rabin, supra note 45, at 2053–54 (advocating for government standards defense).
143. See supra notes 7, 90, & 102–18 and accompanying text for the Third
Circuit’s justification in Sikkelee for its premarket approval preemption framework;
see also supra notes 134–41 and accompanying text for a discussion of how Third
Circuit practitioners can employ Sikkelee when handling preemption issues.
144. See Geier, 529 U.S at 894 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Supremacy
Clause does not give unelected federal judges carte blanche to use federal law as a
means of imposing their own idea of tort reform on the States.”); Chemerinsky,
supra note 2, at 1327 (explaining that expansive preemption doctrine overrides
federalism principles and state sovereignty).
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